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INTRODUCTION 
 
Because Indian gaming is one of the most important sources of revenue for many Indian 
tribes, it is crucial that the industry remain well regulated.  Strong regulation serves 
several practical functions.  First, it protects Indian gaming from crime, ranging from 
petty theft by low-level employees to complex money laundering activities by members 
of organized crime.  Second, strong regulation provides comfort to the gaming patron and 
the public in general that gaming is being done in a fair and honest manner and is free of 
criminal influence. 
 
The particular vulnerability of gaming is that casino gaming involves large sums of cash 
changing hands in millions of transactions each day by thousands of people across the 
country.  In an age in which transactions in most other areas of commerce are dominated 
by less fungible and more secure financial instruments, such as credit cards, debit cards 
and checks, casinos still predominantly operate with cash.  The cash intensive nature of 
the gaming industry makes it particularly attractive – and particularly vulnerable – to 
crime and corruption.   
 
Despite this vulnerability, crime and corruption has, for the most part, been controlled in 
Indian gaming through vigilant adherence by gaming regulators to two primary 
regulatory strategies: careful background investigations of the key actors in Indian 
gaming, and strong internal control procedures for casino operations.  It is widely agreed 
within the gaming industry in general that background investigations and internal 
controls are crucial to effective regulation.  Today, no reasonable commentator could 
seriously deny the importance and effectiveness of these regulatory strategies in 
protecting the industry.   
 
Thus, the key question today is not whether these regulatory strategies are valuable and 
important, but which governments, tribal, federal, or state, should bear the ultimate 
responsibility for implementing these regulatory strategies.  The regulation of gaming has 
been plagued by a lack of clarity in the roles of the respective regulatory entities.  It is an 
appropriate time for Congress to clarify those roles to provide better guidance to the 
industry and to gaming regulators. 
 
A. THE ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS IN REGULATING INDIAN 
GAMING. 
 
When IGRA was enacted in 1988, most observers anticipated that states would take the 
opportunity afforded by the tribal-state compacting process to develop a strong regulatory 
presence over Class III Indian gaming.  Some states took that opportunity and developed 
strong, reliable, and effective gaming regulatory agencies that provide vital assistance in 
insuring the integrity of Indian gaming.  Other states, however, expressed little interest in 
regulating Indian gaming and failed to negotiate a significant regulatory role in tribal-
state gaming compacts.  These states have been “no-shows” in the important area of 
 Washburn testimony 
May 11, 2006 
Page 2     
 
 
regulation.  While substantially all of the states have shown a strong interest in tribal 
gaming revenues, fewer have shown significant interest in the actual regulation of Indian 
gaming.  In other words, state gaming regulation has been inconsistent: strong in some 
states, weak in others.   
 
Even in the states that have undertaken a significant regulatory role in Class III Indian 
gaming, their efforts are vulnerable to criticism.  Some of these criticisms are in the 
nature of conflicts of interest.  On one hand, a state may feel ambivalent or even 
somewhat hostile to Indian gaming activity.  For the Indian tribes that have gaming 
operations, gaming revenues help them maximize the exercise of their tribal 
governmental power and authority, that is, their tribal sovereignty.  American history is 
littered with clashes between states and tribes; American legal history is a reflection of 
these battles.  A leading Supreme Court case once described the people of the states as 
“the deadliest enemies” of American Indian tribes.  While today these clashes are less 
often “deadly” in the most immediate sense, the clashes between tribal and state authority 
continue.  Indeed, in recent years, one such clash or another has gone all the way up to 
the Supreme Court nearly every Term.  In this context, it is easy to see why state 
governments may feel conflicted about preserving the integrity of Indian gaming to help 
tribes maximize tribal sovereignty. 
 
On the other hand, where a state government does have an interest in maximizing Indian 
gaming revenues, which occurs when tribes have entered gaming revenue-sharing 
arrangements with state governments, states may have a different sort of conflict of 
interest.  States that share Indian gaming revenues have an interest in maximizing gaming 
revenues.  Meeting strict regulatory requirements can sometimes be expensive; 
compliance can therefore affect the bottom line and reduce gaming profits.  A state’s 
short-term interest in maximizing revenues may therefore overshadow its interest in the 
integrity of Indian gaming.  This can also create a potential conflict of interest for state 
regulators. 
 
As a result of these conflicts of interest at the state level, state regulation leaves the 
Indian gaming industry vulnerable.  The quality of regulation of Indian casinos ought not 
be subject to the mercy of state budgetary cycles or vary because of a potential conflict of 
interest.  Congress should respect the decision of some states to “opt out” of Indian 
gaming regulation.  That does not mean, however, that Indian gaming should be left 
unregulated if a state refuses to undertake this important responsibility.  The federal and 
tribal governments must exercise appropriate roles over Class III gaming, and Congress 
should clearly recognize those roles.  The integrity of Indian gaming must be carefully 
protected if Indian gaming is to remain an important tribal asset in the future. 
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B. THE PROPER ROLE OF TRIBAL AND FEDERAL REGULATORS IN 
INDIAN GAMING. 
 
1. Tribes should have the primary responsibility, though not the exclusive 
responsibility for regulating Indian gaming.  The primary responsibility for insuring 
that Indian casinos adopt and adhere to adequate internal controls ought to lie with tribal 
gaming regulators who have the advantage of physical proximity and already exercise a 
variety of regulatory functions within Indian gaming operations.  During the past fifteen 
years, a large and sophisticated community of professional tribal gaming regulators has 
taken root across the country.  Tribal gaming regulators have proven themselves, in the 
main, as effective regulators.  In most circumstances, tribal regulators work 
conscientiously, competently and independently in providing strong regulation of Indian 
casinos.  Recognizing their primacy in undertaking these sovereign responsibilities is 
likely to produce the most effective regulation. However, tribal regulatory structures have 
some obvious regulatory weaknesses and vulnerabilities that justify a strong oversight 
role for federal regulators, including the need for federal regulators to take independent 
enforcement action where tribal gaming regulators fail to meet their sovereign 
responsibilities. 
 
2. Each tribal regulator has a responsibility to his own tribe that makes him myopic 
as to the national interest of all Indian tribes.  Federal regulators, on the other hand, 
can protect the integrity of the entire industry.  Although it is true that fundamental 
notions of tribal sovereignty and self-determination ought to protect the right of each 
tribal government to make regulatory decisions without federal oversight, Indian gaming 
is an exception to this principle.  I justify exceptionalism on this basis: one of the 
practical ramifications of tribal sovereignty is that no tribe can be held accountable to any 
other tribe.  Yet, despite their legal insulation from one another and their lack of mutual 
accountability, Indian tribal decisions can harm other tribes.  In the highly politicized 
world of Indian gaming, no tribe is an island unto itself.  Indeed, the political fallout from 
incompetent or corrupt actions of one tribe may well impact hundreds of other tribes 
across the country.  Indian gaming exists at the sufferance of Congress and state 
legislatures and the public whom those bodies represent.  If one tribe’s casino succumbs 
to corruption or otherwise earns infamy, then the entire Indian gaming industry may well 
be tainted.  The integrity of the industry – and even the perception of integrity – must be 
guarded with vigilance.  In Indian gaming, tribes are linked inextricably to one another.  
Because no tribe has the ability to regulate other sovereign tribes, this problem is one that 
tribes cannot solve themselves.  In my view, this lack of accountability of one tribe to 
another justifies federal oversight to accomplish what tribes cannot achieve through 
collective action.  In other words, the federal government’s own sovereign authority in 
this area can offer sound regulatory coverage that tribes could never achieve on their 
own. 
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3. Federal regulators can provide oversight to tribal regulators, who may have 
conflicts of interest, and may need external support to buttress their authority 
within the tribal government.  The risk of occasional irresponsible behavior by tribal 
regulators is quite real, for a couple of reasons.2  First, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
does not currently require that Indian tribes have independent tribal gaming commissions.  
Many tribes have created gaming commissions, but the relative independence of these 
commissions varies.  Tribal commissioners are sometimes directly accountable to tribal 
leaders and/or tribal voters.  While, in most circumstances, the tribal interest in the long 
term health of the gaming operation will give each tribal regulator a strong incentive to 
regulate responsibly, there may occasionally be overwhelming temptation to cut 
regulatory corners for short term gains.  In other words, tribal regulators have the same 
type of conflict of interest that state regulators have.  And, in some cases, the conflict will 
be even more severe.  Federal regulators can minimize the damage caused by such 
conflicts of interest by subjecting tribal regulators to independent oversight. 
 
4. Tribal regulators will sometimes lack the will to close an Indian casino that has 
engaged in gross irregularities.  Because most tribal governments operate only a single 
Indian casino, and thus the tribal gaming regulatory agency has authority only over one 
casino, there is a serious risk that the tribal regulator will occasionally “pull his punches.” 
In circumstances where one tribe operates one casino, the tribal regulator’s job is 
dependent on the existence of the Indian casino.  Such a regulator will not be inclined to 
shut down the casino even for gross misconduct.  Hopefully, the need for closure of an 
entire casino will be rare, but it is precisely in the most egregious circumstances when it 
ought to be done.  The NIGC must have clear authority to take appropriate action over 
Class III casinos, including closure, especially in cases in which tribal regulators fail to 
act.   
 
5. Tribal regulators are also more likely to succumb to “regulatory capture.”  
“Regulatory capture” is the term used to define a regulatory agency’s tendency to align 
its interests and collude with the firms it is ostensibly regulating, to the detriment of the 
public interest.  The rich and diverse academic literature on capture reflects the notion 
that a regulated industry will attempt influence the regulator to prevent vigorous 
enforcement of the regulatory regime.  Some scholars say “capture” is unavoidable: 
regulators will become instruments of the regulated community and will inevitably act in 
favor of the regulated community.  Others take a pragmatic view that “capture” will exist 
to a greater or lesser degree depending on the legal structures that are used to guard 
against it, but that the threat of capture can be managed with prudent laws and sound 
regulatory structures.  One risk factor for capture is a high degree of discretion by 
regulators.  Wide discretion not only creates the opportunity for regulators to rule in favor 
of the regulated community, but also provides cover for doing so because the essence of 
discretion is power unconstrained by enforceable legal authority.   The regulation of 
                                                 
2 I addressed some of the same issues in detail in testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs on April 27, 2005, and September 21, 2005.  A link to this testimony can be found at 
http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/washburnk.htm. 
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gaming almost always involves a high degree of discretion by regulators.  Many 
regulators assert as a matter of law that their discretion to grant or deny gaming licenses 
is unfettered by due process requirements because involvement in gaming is not a right, 
but a privilege.  Though this argument is less compelling under modern notions of due 
process, it reflects a widely held view among gaming regulators and it creates enormous 
unchecked discretion in the hands of the gaming regulator.  Such broad discretion can 
increase the risk of capture.   
 
6. Federal regulatory oversight can minimize “capture” of tribal regulators. Another 
risk factor relates to the number of groups interested in the regulator’s performance.  A 
regulatory agency that has many regulatory entities within its jurisdiction and many other 
interested groups interested in its work is less likely to succumb to capture by any one 
group, because it will be held accountable to some degree by each of the entities and 
interested groups and each will scrutinize agency action.  So, for example, when the FCC 
makes a decision related to the regulation of communications, AT&T or Verizon may cry 
foul if Qwest gets favorable treatment that the others perceive as unfair.  Such 
competition within the regulated industry makes the regulator more accountable and thus 
serves as an important check on regulatory capture.  In contrast, many tribal regulatory 
agencies have authority over only a single entity.  In this “one tribe, one casino” model, 
tribal regulators work repeatedly with the same Indian casino officials.  Thus, the 
structure of Indian gaming markets renders tribal gaming regulators tremendously 
vulnerable to capture.  Tribal regulators will thus face less scrutiny than other regulators; 
they will hear only one voice, rather than many, when they make regulatory decisions.  
While outside interest groups can sometimes have an impact in preventing capture, there 
are few independent interest groups looking out for tribal members or casino patrons in 
the Indian gaming industry.  Federal regulators can serve the role of overseeing tribal 
regulators, pushing them to be vigilant and requiring them to resist capture. 
 
7. Federal regulators have a comparative advantage in protecting all Indian gaming.  
Because of internal tribal pressures and the natural conflicts of interest of tribal 
regulators, federal regulators have a comparative advantage.  Federal regulators are 
largely disinterested and objective; they have no significant conflicts of interest because 
they obtain no direct or significant benefit from the development of any particular Indian 
gaming facility.   
 
8. Uniform federal standards are better than individual state or tribal standards 
because federal standards can assure the integrity of gaming on a national scope 
and indirectly increase the quality and independence of tribal regulators.  In the 
context of internal controls, the adoption of uniform federal standards creates a baseline 
for quality of regulation nationwide.  Creation of such standards not only helps patrons, it 
facilitates the independence of tribal gaming commissioners by insuring that knowledge 
and expertise is portable from one reservation to another.  Nationwide standards assure a 
national network of training and job opportunities that collectively serve to improve the 
professionalism of tribal gaming regulators.  If a tribal regulator is fired from one 
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reservation for applying the rules too rigorously, for example, he may well be able to find 
work with a gaming commission at another reservation.   
 
9. Federal regulation is best if it allows adequate flexibility at the tribal level.  
Federal regulators cannot be as responsive to the unique needs and circumstances of each 
individual tribe.  Moreover, technology and other relevant circumstances will change 
much more quickly than regulators can update a complex and comprehensive regulatory 
regime, such as the federal minimum internal controls standards.  To address these 
disadvantages, tribal gaming commissions and federal regulators should be open-minded 
and sensible about allowing reasonable variances to the federal standards.   
 
C. RECOMMENDATION  
 
Indian tribes deserve clarity about the gaming regulatory structure.  Likewise, the NIGC 
will be able to operate with greater confidence and legitimacy if it has a clear 
Congressional mandate on its authority to regulate.  Because it is in the best interest of 
Indian gaming for an independent and objective regulator to oversee all significant 
gaming activity, Congress should strengthen the NIGC’s mandate over Class III gaming.  
Congress should recognize the NIGC’s authority to assure the integrity of Indian 
gaming extends to Class III gaming activity for all purposes, including background 
investigations of management contractors, minimum internal control standards, and 
health and safety.   
 
Second, federal Indian gaming regulators must be cognizant of the fact that it is sovereign 
governments they are regulating.  Many disputes between Indian tribes and the NIGC 
have arisen when federal regulators have behaved in a heavy-handed fashion.  While such 
heavy-handedness is the norm among regulators within the commercial gaming industry 
in Nevada and New Jersey and other jurisdictions, the circumstances are far different in 
Indian gaming.  Regulators in Nevada and New Jersey are regulating private actors, not 
sovereign nations. 
 
Federal regulators must behave much more carefully and respectfully toward the 
regulated industry.  To be effective, NIGC regulators must not be merely regulators, 
but also educators and diplomats.  While federal regulators must utilize a variety of 
skills to achieve tribal compliance, reliance on aggressive regulatory tactics sometimes 
simply masks ineffectiveness.  Federal regulators should treat tribal regulators and tribal 
officials with the same respect and deference that they would use toward state officials.  
To some degree, this means that the NIGC requires adequate financial resources to 
recruit, hire, and retain the best regulatory professionals in the country.  Given the 
context, the task for federal regulators is simply much more difficult than for state 
regulators. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
To protect the value of Indian gaming as a resource for all tribes, Congress should clarify 
the strong role for federal regulators in Class III Indian gaming.  For most tribes, which 
engage in responsible regulation of Indian gaming, the NIGC role will be nearly 
invisible.  While a strong role for the NIGC clearly treads on tribal sovereignty, it is a 
pragmatic and necessary step to insure the long-term viability of gaming as a resource for 
all tribes. 
 
Thank you for seeking for my views on this important subject. 
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